Abstract
日本におけるネイチャーベースドツーリズム政策のライフサイク ルアナリシス

Introduction
Despite the size of the Japanese tourism market, there has been little Western research to investigate its socioeconomic dynamics. Moreover, despite its rapid "boom and bust" trajectory, there have been few empirical attempts Ϫ even within Japan Ϫ to analyze the evolution of nature-based tourism (hereafter NBT) development. This paper seeks to address those shortfalls, using Butler's (1980) Tourism Area Life Cycle (TALC) model to provide fresh perspectives on the rise and fall of NBT, and the subsequent challenges of revitalizing the market using ecotourism.
Domestic tourism in Japan is a behemoth with an economic impact of 23.9 trillion yen and a ripple effect of 54 trillion yen in fiscal 2005 (MLIT 2005 ). Yet indicators suggest a shrinking industry that has struggled to shake off the economic and environmental scars of the Resort Law enacted in 1987, from which point Ϫ according to the TALC model Ϫ it faced a period of prolonged "Decline" with successive drops in tourist numbers and revenue. This decline reflects the current inequalities in the ruralϪurban power balance, which is strongly affected by national tourism and land use policies. NBT is a unique barometer of this power balance, given its position at the crossroads of rural supply and urban demand.
The objectives of this paper are thus two-fold. First, using data for annual visits to nature parks as a proxy for NBT demand, this paper tracks the development and current state of the NBT market to draw wider conclusions about the tourism industry in Japan. To do so, the TALC model is employed to chart the rise of NBT in Japan through five different stages of development. Second, the post-TALC market is assessed, the emergence of ecotourism described, and the challenges for rejuvenation discussed.
Definition of key terms and methodology
Given the broad nature of this paper, some definitions of key terms are first required. Tourism is a multi-faceted industry that includes a broad range of products from primary (e.g., sales of regional produce) to tertiary (e.g., provision of services). Definitions of tourism differ from "recreation" and "leisure" due to the focus on its economic impact; indeed, acceptance of tourism as one of the world's largest and fastest growing industries in recent decades has been underpinned by its economic significance (Pigram and Jenkins 1999) .
NBT is a tourism sub-segment said to account for 20% to 60% of the overall market (Jones 2009 ). However, because it is characterized by trips to rural destinations such as parks and protected areas, it involves consumption of public as well as private goods, requiring effective and long-sighted policy making. Thus, NBT management approaches typically aspire to balance economic and environmental goals. To quantify this demand for NBT, annual visitation records from Japan's nature parks were used as a proxy since they extend back to 1950, and are thus one of the oldest databases in circulation (Hirose 2007) . Nature parks, which include national, quasi-national, and prefectural parks, account for over 14% of Japan's total landmass, and the system is therefore also one of the broadest NBT indicators. As well as geographical reach, nature parks symbolize the trade-off between conservation and tourism; national parks in particular contain many of Japan's most popular tourist sites and Ϫ according to Ueda Yasuyuki, a career parks administrator Ϫ "designation is thus intended for nature tourism" (quoted in Havens 2011: 127) . Trends in park visitation can thus provide vital clues as to the robustness of the broader NBT market; as consumable public goods, NBT destinations paradoxically tend to lose their natural characteristics the more successful they become. Hence, their development closely reflects Butler's (1980) TALC model Ϫ originally based on the product life cycle Ϫ which suggests that "resorts become unattractive with the passage of time, as visitor numbers increase and their carrying capacities are exceeded, and are unable to compete with other newer resorts" (Smith 1991 ).
Butler's six-stage TALC model (see Figure 1 ) has been used extensively to research destinations from individual beach resorts to national tourism policies. It has attracted considerable criticism; for example, Choy (1992) proposed that destination differences were too great to fit a standardized model, while Haywood (1986) theorized a variety of TALC alternatives. However, the model has nonetheless proved remarkably resilient, and it provides a powerful analytical framework with which to dissect NBT development in Japan, up until the implosion of the Resort Law policy or rezōto rettō, in the words of then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1987.
Exploration (1886Ϫ1906)
Japan's pre-modern tourism industry shared aspects of its development with Europe, such as religion "provid[ing] both the objective and the means of travel" (March 2005) . Travel for religious purposes was closely linked to nature; hence, some of the oldest sites of worship were mountain temples and shrines such as Mount Kōya and Kumano Shrine. A national travel infrastructure enabled pilgrims to visit the Imperial Shrine at Ise and climb sacred mountains such as Tateyama.
If such journeys were the early equivalent of NBT, the regional specialties brought back were the forerunners of modern omiyage ('souvenirs'). In extreme cases, such as that of Mount Fuji, purchase of local souvenirs was a social obligation as tangible proof of the visit due to the lottery attendance system of the Fuji-kō. Travelers to Fuji were also taxed for an ingenious variety of tolls including bouiri 'board', yamayakusen 'entrance', enzasen 'rest stops', and misogiryō 'spiritual purification' (Iwashina 1983) . Climbers were also accompanied by local oshi 'guides', who functioned much like modern-day tour operators (Kikuchi 2001) . Customs such as these ensured a substantial input for regional economies, even inspiring some authors to claim they fulfilled current "ecotourism" criteria (Itō 2009 ).
However, alongside the age-old customs of visiting destinations such as Kōya, Fuji, and Ise Ϫ and hot spring resorts such as Kusatsu Ϫ a new generation of NBT landscapes was also emerging to meet the imported Western perceptions that shaped Meiji modernization. This latter category included mountain resorts such as Karuizawa, Kamikōchi, and Unzen Ϫ all "discovered" by visiting Westerners seeking refuge from hot, humid summers. The Kamikōchi example illustrates the extraordinarily rapid train of events which propelled hitherto unknown okuyama areas (i.e., remote areas of backcountry Ϫ mountainous forest that was rendered largely inaccessible due to a combination of geophysical and religious boundaries) to the forefront of the national consciousness. In 1907, a map-making expedition charted the northern ridges of the Chūbu Sangaku, which "had never been systematically surveyed" (Wigen 2005 ). Yet, within three decades, the area had been popularized as the "Japan Alps" Ϫ legitimized by the writings of Walter Weston, a British chaplain, and social networks such as the Japan Alpine Club, which sprung up around the new sport of alpinism. There were also political forces at work, as the exploration process paved the way for central government annexation of large swathes of Japan's mountainous backbone for designation as National Forests and later as National Parks.
Exploration thus resulted in the "nationalization" of natural resources, but it simultaneously provided access for new social agendas. In the Alps, mountaineering was "reinvented for scientific or recreational purposes by the newly emerging middle class" (Manzenreiter 2000: p. 1) . Social and legal liberalization were thus intertwined with Western individualism, and domestic travel was increasingly deregulated, for example in 1871 when passports were deemed superfluous for domestic trips. Modernization of access infrastructure rapidly reduced journey times; ferries were replaced by bridges, while horse-drawn buses and rickshaws became widespread for shorter journeys (March 2005) . The rapid growth of the railway system from non-existence in 1867 to 39,000 miles of railroad track by 1906 (see Boyle 1993 ) also brought radical change to the travel market, altering the urbanϪrural power balance and paving the way for subsequent urbanization and centralization.
In summary, this stage eradicated some indigenous travel customs, while others survived and were amalgamated with Western ideas of tourism development. The shift from "pilgrimage" to "pleasure" reflected changes in the social class structure, but even as the removal of certain physical, social, and legal barriers promised broader access, central government was tightening its grip on the natural resources.
Involvement (1907Ϫ1938)
The Hotel Development Law from 1907 and establishment of the Japan Tourist Bureau in 1912 were milestones that symbolized the start of a new stage of "Involvement" (Leheny 2003) . Both were symbolic of the publicϪprivate development path that would follow, with tourism assuming an ever-greater role in land policies as shown by the publicly owned hotels built by the Railways Ministry. As in the West, railways helped facilitate the leap from pilgrimage to pleasure. Just a half-century earlier, Thomas Cook, an English Baptist minister and social reformer, had "combined his visions of democratic travel and the promotion of sobriety, with the chance to profit financially from the opportunities for taking townspeople to the countryside or abroad" (Graburn 1989: 21Ϫ36) .
This new concept of NBT as a platform for regional development, complete with railways, standardized hotels, and restaurants, was an enticing prospect for impoverished local governments in rural economies. For example, villages at the foot of Fuji's northern flank in Yamanashi Prefecture were the poorer, mountainous cousins of communities on the Shizuoka side, which possessed substantial fishing and agricultural assets, and some well-known hot spring resorts on the main trade route between Kanto and Kansai (Totman 2007) . Yamanashi thus pinned its hopes on tourism from an early stage, resulting in a raft of development plans such as the Hokuroku Tourism Development Plan in 1916 Ϫ an early example of land policies centered on tourism (Tsuchiya 1981) .
One important subsection of the Fuji NBT market was mountain climbers. In the competition to attract climbers, the Subashiri trailhead in Shizuoka had previously been the most popular route, but access development tipped the balance in favor of Yoshidaguchi (in Yamanashi) due to its higher elevation (Murakushi 2006) . Then, in 1926, construction began on a rail link between Otsuki and Kamiyoshida, further reducing the travel time to Yamanashi from Tokyo. Other improvements in travel infrastructure such as roads and trails were accompanied by accommodation facilities when Lake Yamanaka Hotel opened in 1928, serving as a catalyst to draw new segments of the tourism market to the destination (Johnston 2001) . "International standard" hotels were a key component of the central government's policy to attract foreign tourists, with construction funded by low-interest, longterm loans from the Ministry of Finance. An important supply-side benchmark for NBT development was reached in 1931, when the National Parks Law was eventually passed and the first twelve parks designated by 1936. At Fuji and other sites, the imminent designation drove up land prices, with real estate agents reporting a ten-fold rise at Yamanaka (Yamamoto 2003) . NBT also fired the imagination of local entrepreneurs, another characteristic of this stage of the TALC. In Yamanashi's case, Horiuchi Ryōhei played a key role, establishing a railway company and real estate agency to construct holiday homes. Horiuchi's vision for Lake Yamanaka's development was based on Karuizawa; both had been "discovered" as summer resort destinations by foreigners, and then actively developed around an NBT image: the provisional selection of the Fuji Five Lakes in a 1927 poll of "Japan's eight best landscapes". 2 The image was carefully cultivated, as, for example when Horiuchi invited Tokutomi Sohō to write a serial publication called "Letters from Fuji" (Fuji dayori), begun in 1929.
Meanwhile, even as the pace of supply-side development quickened, NBT demand was further fuelled by the advent of package tours heralded by a 1933 advertisement in Tabi magazine. 3 Then, in 1934, the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) merged with the Japan Travel Society and assumed sole responsibility for group travel. JTB's entrance into domestic tourism and subsequent rivalry with Nippon Ryokō would shape NBT's subsequent development as centralized organizations took an increasingly powerful grip on the market. Even in markets where local businesses maintained a firmer grip, notably local transport and real estate, the resulting growth trajectory was often unequal. As the case of Fuji's two flanks shows, local residents would later find themselves divided by the inequalities which NBT created. But at this stage, even though the necessary ingredients for mass tourism were starting to take shape, the products themselves remained the reserve of an elite minority.
Development (1945Ϫ1963)
Although the "Development" stage of the TALC model is said to be characterized by widely known resorts and visitor congestion, Japan's all-out war effort had devastated the countryside leading to deforested mountainous areas, flash floods, and landslides. But after a brief hiatus, NBT demand soared in an unprecedented fashion, and in 1950 the number of visits to national parks topped 50 million for the first time.
The economy was recovering quickly after WWII, with GDP growing steadily at an annualized average of 11% from 1955 to 1973. NBT multipliers were seen as a ticket for regeneration, attracting significant funds for infrastructure improvement. A series of land development acts paved the way for an "economy first" philosophy introduced by the General Headquarters and carried over by the "iron triangle" that emerged from "the close interplay of bureaucracy, politics and big business" (Feldhoff 2002: 165Ϫ175) . 4 Even as central government planners were redefining the physical landscape, the industry itself was undergoing radical change, as exemplified by the Travel Intermediary Law, enacted in 1952, which allowed travel agents to act as intermediaries. However, their main business activities were restricted to acting as sales agents for railway and other transport companies, as well as accommodation, including ryokan (Japanese-style inns). Hence, most travel companies established in the 1950s were subsidiaries of the large railway companies (March 2005) . In 1955, the National Tourist Association and the Japanese Tourist Association were founded, and in 1956, a "Five-year Tourist Industry Promotion Plan" was launched (Soshiroda 2004) . Mass tourism followed shortly Ϫ epitomized by shokuba dantai trips (i.e., group trips organized by companies for their employees with semi-obligatory attendance). Tour operators assembled the various elements into a convenient package for the urban consumer, and by buying in bulk, they were available to obtain economies of scale that brought remote NBT destinations within affordable reach of the mass market (Van Wijk and Persoon 2007) .
In addition to package tours, better infrastructure and increased ease of access created additional stimuli for NBT growth, as demonstrated at Fuji, where a paved road brought buses to the Fifth Station in 1952 (Sayama and Nishida 2001) . Annual visitation to Fuji-Hakone-Izu national park tripled in three years, passing 10 million in 1960, and 30 million in 1963. Fuji also typified national trends in another way, for whereas Western images of tourism centered on "sand, sea, and sex", in Japan it was often mountains that formed the backdrop to NBT destinations. In 1955, a local newspaper estimated summer visitation to the combined Fuji Five Lakes area at over 300,000, while in 1963, 152,000 campers were reported at Lake Yamanaka alone. As the TALC model predicts, the local population were easily outnumbered during seasonal peaks, although many were still in favor of tourism because of its perceived economic impact.
Yet the campers themselves were under threat by the rapid TALC trajectory, for as NBT demand increased, it also moved up-market. From 1961, the number of planning permission applications for holiday homes increased rapidly, signaling an increase in "status-symbol" purchases. This was also the year in which the Mount Fuji Hotel opened. This large-scale resort hotel symbolized the increased capacity and higher level of service that new generations of wealthy, urban visitors were coming to expect. However, the standardization of services Ϫ such as modern hotels with heated, Western-style toilets Ϫ was symptomatic of a trend that would eventually have severe consequences for NBT. Coupled with the relentless demand for holiday homes, real estate prices were driven up further by golf courses and marinas. Ultimately, the artificially inflated land prices provoked a vicious circle that culminated in the passage of the Resort Law in 1987.
Central government did implement countermeasures to regulate the spiraling pace of NBT development, notably when the Nature Parks Law was enacted in 1957 to create a triple-layered hierarchy of national, quasi-national, and prefectural parks. But the implementation of this new system was a compromise. It allowed nature parks to be low-cost and low-profile, as land could be designated regardless of ownership, and there were no entrance fees or concessions to be purchased, but at the same time it severely limited attempts to channel NBT development via holistic management plans. Nonetheless, as a model of regional development, the national parks proved such a successful funnel for public works funds that they inspired a host of "copycat" designations. Administrators were forced to resort to numerical limits to try and rein in the rapid development, and a maximum of "20 national parks" was imposed Ϫ but then exceeded in 1963, when San'in Kaigan was designated as a new national park.
The annual number of visits to all national parks was also increasing rapidly, from 90 to 145 million between 1960 and 1963. However, mass NBT came with strings attached; environmental impacts were increasing in scale and frequency, and even as NBT sites became increasingly familiar, they grew commodified. In a classic TALC paradox, competition among local destinations resulted in a loss of individuality, eroding the likelihood of future visits. Thus, although often implemented under the manifesto of regional development, tourism's role as an agent of change can be seen to have ironically contributed to the ongoing trans-fer of power away from the rural regions Ϫ for even as the financial leakage increased, the local communities grew steadily more reliant on the flow of urban visitors from centralized travel agencies.
Consolidation (1964Ϫ1974)
The next stage of "Consolidation" also saw a tourism boom triggered by the "economy first" approach shaped by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and encapsulated by the "Golden Sixties" (Johnson 1982) . In 1963, the Basic Tourism Law was enacted, and the pace of development accelerated due to a string of hallmark events such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the 1970 Osaka Expo, and the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics. In particular, the build-up to the Tokyo Olympics saw a period of frenzied infrastructure development akin to Beijing in 2008; "multiple train and subway lines were completed, as was a large highway building project crisscrossing the metropolitan area" (Droubie 2008) . As in China, the path for large-scale land use projects was smoothed by "bundling" of interests and policies into cooperative publicϪprivate ventures that brought state benefits such as preferential access to land or funds to those willing to comply (Kostka and Hobbs forthcoming).
The improved access brought new waves of visitors to NBT sites such as parks, and visitation rates climbed exponentially as automobile tourism became widespread. The rise in private car ownership was linked not only to explosive growth in disposable income and higher standards of living, but also to widespread and increasingly large-scale civil engineering projects that were opening up the Japanese countryside to urban audiences. Development at Fuji is again symbolic of wider trends, and it included tunnels (such as the Misaka tunnel toll road which opened in 1967, greatly reducing the travel time from Kōfu), highways (such as the 1969 opening of the Chūō Highway from Chōfu to Kawaguchiko, slashing the travel time from Tokyo), and toll roads (such as the Fuji Subaru Line in Yamanashi and the Fuji Skyline road that opened in Shizuoka in 1970, reducing access time from the Chūbu and Kinki regions).
However, even as the numbers of NBT visitors continued to increase, the limits of growth were also becoming apparent. After a series of high-profile pollution incidents, an unprecedented level of public outrage provided political pressure for a Basic Law for Pollution Control, passed in 1967. After the so-called "pollution diet", the Environment Agency (hereafter EA) was subsequently established in 1971, with a broad agenda including promotion of policies for pollution control and nature conservation. The EA thus assumed theoretical responsibility for NBT management via administration of nature parks, but in reality the area of land owned outright by the EA was minuscule, amounting to less than 0.2% of the total national parkland (Katō 2008: 23) . Meanwhile its administrative clout was similarly subdued; in terms of vetoing development projects, for example, the EA's express permission was required only for changes to the special protection areas (tokubetsu hogo chiku) of nature parks, which represent only 6.3% of the total park area. Despite these severe restrictions, the EA began to gradually shift the focus of NBT away from mass tourism toward conservation, although the transition was not painless as the EA's first director, Oishi, "showed a strong preference for protection over recreational or industrial use of the national parks, [which] alienated local residents and businesses who sought infrastructure and development" (Havens 2011: 144) .
To manage NBT visitors in a sustainable fashion, the EA tried to complement one-off "hard" infrastructure development with long-term funding for "soft" projects and ongoing visitor services. This was a process that had been initiated by their predecessors in park management, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, who had introduced systems of nature trails from 1957 onward and the first generation of Visitor Centers from 1963. The latter were intended to function as a national system of visitor service hubs, mitigating impacts and providing an educational framework to channel the flow of NBT. However, they were undermined from the outset by inaccessible locations as well as a lack of staff and funding and remained underapreciated by the majority of the package tourists.
Yet the EA's fledgling attempts to encourage conservation in parks Ϫ and use NBT to raise the level of environmental awareness across the nation Ϫ were bolstered by the spread of local groups and an increasingly vociferous civil rights movement that was beginning to actively demonstrate against the "economy first" approach. The international trend of the "environmentalist" 1970s was reflected in domestic movements, as when the sūpā rindō (forestry maintenance road projects) Ϫ which cut through the territories of some eight national parks Ϫ stirred up fierce protest from local conservation groups.
Just as significant for domestic NBT were changes in underlying market components, particularly the rapid increase in overseas travel. As part of the re-emergence into the international community in 1964, the Japanese government had lifted the severe restrictions on overseas travel that had been intended to stem the outflow of yen. 5 Numbers of outbound visitors increased gradually until 1971, when the trickle became a flood as the floating yen system was initiated, resulting in a doubling of outbounds by 1973. This new threat indirectly intensified the competition among domestic destinations, so that even though NBT numbers continued to rise, the limits of growth became increasingly apparent.
Stagnation (1975Ϫ1991)
The first year on record in which annual national park visits posted a year-on-year decline was 1975. Visitor demand for parks, like the broader NBT market, was stagnant for a number of reasons, most notably the oil crisis of 1973, which caused the price of commodities to spike, temporarily stalling the economy and bringing about a series of fiscal belt-tightening initiatives.
Given the "economy-first" dictum, how were NBT numbers able to overcome the decline and recover to stabilize and surpass previous levels? One factor is the role of central government, which was readier than ever to intervene to shore up consumer demand Ϫ even tweaking national leisure policy via widespread promotion of the five-day working week. Support came from the transport sector via marketing campaigns such as Japan National Railways' "Discover Japan" campaign, first run after the 1970 Osaka Expo (Creighton 1997) . A plethora of furusato ('hometown or village') brands emerged to cater for the needs of this generation of urban migrants who had been inadvertently estranged from their spiritual hometowns.
These increasingly commercial "place-selling" tactics thus led emerging market segments of urbanites to see "nature" in terms of a product to be consumed. An era of low-cost, multi-stop package tours had ar-rived in which trips were an-kin-tan ('cheap-near-short') and convenience had become paramount, as Knight (2010: 245) points out: "Japanese sightseeing tours are often extremely condensed, with lots of sights fitted into a limited amount of time, making for a tight schedule and a highly regimented pattern of sightseeing". However, while these tactics were largely successful in reversing the decline in visitor numbers, the intensifying competition between domestic resorts eroded NBT visitor loyalty. And even as improved access and more convenient packaging made an ever-growing catalog of destinations available to urban consumers, it undermined the economic benefits for their rural hosts. For example, after the shinkansen ('bullet train') line was completed in time for the Nagano Winter Olympics in 1998, some enterprises complained that the overnight-stay ratio had declined markedly due to increased day trips from the Kantō plain.
Meanwhile, in the regional-development arena, the economic downturn was linked to wider socioeconomic trends of "hollowed-out" countryside communities. Here the stagnation reflected the broader process of migration away from rural areas in search of tertiary education and jobs in the metropolis (Matanle 2006) . Against this backdrop of radical demographic change, NBT was now acting as an inadvertent driver of change, with infrastructure development paradoxically accelerating the polarization of rural supply and urban demand. Thus, even as Japan's NBT destinations continued to grow, the growth was increasingly inorganic and more reliant on economic "pump-priming". This, in turn, paved the way for a proliferation of public works: highway networks were conceived or consolidated, and, even within conservation areas, the NBT resources themselves came under threat from projects such as the national park roadways, whose construction necessitated considerable felling of old-growth forest and subsequent impact on the surrounding environment (Havens 2011) .
Changes in consumer demand patterns such as the increase in home construction also opened up new NBT markets, such as penshon (a type of boarding house or small hotel). Yet the shortfalls of this highly capitalized form of NBT development were compounded by a lack of holistic planning or long-term vision. This is consistent with TALC analysis, which suggests that "[a] direct result of the lack of direction and regulation of resort growth has been the proliferation of environmental and social problems, poor infrastructure provision and deteriorating resort ambience as these destinations sprawl in an uncontrolled manner" (Smith 1992: 209 ). Yet, given Japan's high degree of centralization, why did holistic tourism planning offer such seemingly insurmountable challenges? The main brake on effective planning was splintered NBT management. During the growth years, NBT had provided a consensus-building platform for regional development factions to rally around. But now, at this later TALC stage, "Stagnation" was revealing some fundamental divides in management objectives. One ongoing dispute was between the logging objectives of the Forestry Agency (under MAFF hereafter FA) and the conservation-based agenda of the newly formed EA (Imura 2005) . This particular conflict intensified in the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in a high-profile showdown on Hokkaido in 1987, when protestors rallied against the FA's plans to log 1,700 hectares of virgin forest in Shiretoko National Park. Although a relatively small area, this particular incident inspired overwhelming support for the Shiretoko National Trust movement that opposed the plan. Yet in other less high-profile cases, NBT policy making in the national parks and elsewhere was consistently undermined by such factionalism among central government agencies. Meanwhile, the complicated mosaic of land ownership and lack of financing diluted the EA's attempts to take wholesale measures to resolve visitor service issues (such as traffic jams and visitor congestion) and promote NBT in a holistic manner.
Given the bureaucratic quagmire, the need to implement cross-cutting policies was clear. More integrated tourism policies also coincided with international thinking, or as Valene Smith (1989: 1) puts it in the introduction to her edited work Hosts and Guests: "the advent of largescale tourism often necessitates the transfer of local control to a central government, which has the power to compete internationally for the tourist trade by offering concessions, in the form of favorable taxes or negotiated land values, to induce major hotel chains to construct facilities". Japan had been quick to begin this process, as demonstrated by the prewar national park hotel resorts mentioned above. Now it became the first country to introduce a numerical target, the "Ten-Million Plan", which aimed to double the number of outbound Japanese tourists from 5 million in 1986 to 10 million by 1991. As well as attempts to ease trade deficits after the Plaza Accord, the policy responded to the Maekawa Report's appeals for increased consumer demand (Leheny 2003). The plan was immediately successful: outbound tourists duly exceeded 10 million in 1989, encouraged by a buoyant economy and an increasingly strong yen (Soshiroda 2004) . But while outbound numbers increased rapidly, an equivalent "inbound" strategy was much slower to emerge, so an important subtext to the creeping stagnation in domestic tourism was the widening gulf between outbound and inbound markets.
In conclusion, postwar development was so relentless that NBT, like real estate, came to be seen as a permanently expanding vehicle for growth. Yet the reality was "Stagnation", the TALC stage in which reckless, large-scale resort development results in a loss of the "local" qualities that made the destination attractive in the first place. NBT thus became a victim of its own success; in order to stay competitive, rural destinations had to offer ever more convenient, ever more upmarket packages for consumption by the urban masses. A highly capitalized form of NBT development emerged which was undermined by intensifying competition between domestic resorts, by the inboundϪ outbound imbalance, and also by splintered NBT management.
Decline (since 1991)
In the sixth and final stage of Butler's life cycle Ϫ post-stagnation Ϫ the limits of large-scale resorts developed by publicϪprivate corporations have been reached, or exceeded. The next stage is either "Decline", if the destination continues to wane and the resort is not able to reposition itself in the tourism market, or "Rejuvenation", through the creation of new attractions or rebranding of existing ones. This paper will now discuss the realities of the former, before examining the potential of the latter.
TALC analysis has already hinted at how the 1987 Resort Law was the culmination of the NBT life cycle in its attempt to formalize the commodification of large-scale rural resorts into playgrounds for the urban masses. 7 Initially conceived by the National Land Agency, the plan had the potential to convert nearly 40,000 square kilometers Ϫ or 11% of Japan's total landmass Ϫ into purpose-built resorts (Havens 2011) . Moreover, the law Ϫ and the Green Japan Plan, which followed it Ϫ gave tax breaks to development consortiums to obtain land cheaply, and also allocated 10 trillion yen of public money to startup funds. However, "[t]he financial outcomes were for the most part catastrophic", while the environment also suffered widespread damage from the construction of ski resorts, golf clubs, and marinas (Leheny 2003: 126) . Some blueprints were no more than real estate fantasies that failed to comprehend the harsh "feast-or-famine" realities of the tourism market. Others Ϫ particularly ski resorts and golf club memberships Ϫ relied on business models that overestimated the longevity of the exorbitant membership fees of the time. Almost all were eventually undone by the bursting of the real estate bubble. Oura (2008: 40Ϫ 49) concludes that, by 1992, "39% of the 77 designated infrastructure hubs and 83.8% of the planned 2,046 special facilities were incomplete or abandoned".
The stupendous scale of ambition which the Resort Law symbolized was not limited to NBT, but rather echoed the centralized, "supersized" thinking of public planning at the time. For example, theme parks were another sector of the tourism industry in which the scale of development reflected the inflated demand for larger, increasingly upmarket resorts. If anything, the impacts here were even more apparent, as Hall and Page (1999: 106) have pointed out: "prior to the construction of Tokyo Disneyland, the majority of [theme park] sites were small scale [… but] in the period 1988Ϫ92, 21 major developments occurred […] with their costs ranging from ¥ 7 to ¥ 800 million". Theme parks were also symptomatic of another contributing factor to NBT's hard landing after the downturn in real estate prices; the dai-san sekutā ('the third sector') consisted of powerful publicϪprivate conglomerates that had emerged particularly during the 1980s as vehicles for utilization of public funds. The timing of the Resort Law's enactment, which coincided with the privatization of the national rail network, assumes extra significance in this climate of private investors seeking to maximize shortterm profits through tried-and-trusted vehicles of NBT development.
The timing was also significant because it saddled stakeholders with high levels of debt Ϫ often attributable to questionable real estate deals Ϫ that would severely impede rejuvenation. From 1991, the wider economic recession led to spiraling debt in the public sector, and the issue amount of Japanese Government Bonds grew continuously. Compounding this problem was the mindset of fiscal planners in central government, who considered the fundamental problem to be rooted not in deflation but in the decline of domestic consumption, as symbolized by NBT demand. Multiple stimulus packages were launched through policies such as the 1994 Convention Promotion Law, ostensibly focused on regional revitalization, but invariably resulting in yet more public works projects (Kang 2010) . The methods chosen can thus be seen to have largely tackled the symptoms of decline, such as shortterm unemployment, rather than tackling the underlying root causes of the downturn in regional economies.
Propped up by a raft of such policies, the downturn in the NBT market appears deceptively gentle. For example, in the national parks, the total number of visits had declined by less than 17% in 2008 compared to the peak in 1991 (see Figure 3) . However, this overall total masks an increased divergence between a small number of highly popular parks in which visitation has remained constant, or even shown a slight increase, as the overall total has declined. For example, annual visits to Fuji-Hakone-Izu exceeded 100 million in 1986, on the fiftieth anniversary of its designation, before peaking at almost 112 million visits in 1992. But while Fuji visits dipped slightly before recovering to regain almost peak levels, the numbers at other, more inaccessible parks have fallen away dramatically. Hokkaido is a case in point: despite tourism being the northern island's single largest industry, annual visits to its six national parks have shrunk by over 42% between 1991 and 2009.
Meanwhile, a closer examination of trends within the broader tourism market lends further credence to the theory that a more drastic downsizing process is unfolding Ϫ one with serious consequences for NBT. One important indicator is the consistent downturn in the annual While growth remained elusive in a domestic market affected by fewer trips and fewer overnight stays, the number of outbound travelers continued to rise, reaching almost 18 million in 2000. But despite the high numbers of outbounds, a reciprocal influx of foreign tourists was much harder to achieve. There were practical barriers, with inbound demand checked by language, distance from developed markets and Japan's (some would say deserved) image as an expensive destination. But it has also been underscored by the lack of concerted effort to attract inbounds Ϫ even after the gulf between inbound and outbound widened dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, Japan was slow to follow the lead of other OECD nations in instigating specific destination management organizations to catalyze inbound tourism, let alone build a campaign around NBT. . However, although the Visit Japan Campaign has resulted in significant increases in inbound visitors, the 2010 target of 10 million visitors was not achieved. More importantly, after the tragedy of March 2011 and subsequent fears of nuclear fallout, a more integrated approach to marketing Japan as an international destination will be needed if the inbound policies can claim any degree of success.
Yet the discontinuity in inbound and outbound policies does not in itself explain the continued demise of NBT. Demand has also been undermined by indirect effects of urbanization and the rise of the Internet generation, a development that has been linked to the decline in the visitation rate to US national parks (Pergams and Zaradic 2008) . Moreover, there were limits to the interconnected success factors Ϫ such as greater personal disposable incomes, more leisure time, and better infrastructure Ϫ that had brought savings in real transport costs and travel time. In short, the centrally planned publicϪprivate model, epitomized by many of the projects passed under the Resort Law, could no longer be counted upon as a platform for unilateral growth and at times even hampers organic growth. For example, NBT development caused upward pressure of prices for land and housing, and claimed a disproportionate part of public budgets for infrastructure construction (Mak 2004) . Problems were compounded by the large scale of development and the ratcheting nature of debt, often backed by real estate, two factors that quickened the passage of the TALC into Decline.
Rejuvenation Ϫ the rise of "ecotourism"
As tourism, and particularly the NBT market, has gone through this period of extended decline Ϫ or brutal "normalization" after the excesses of the Resort Law Ϫ ecotourism has repeatedly been mentioned as a possible counterstrategy. Yet few attempts have been made to define the parameters of "ecotourism" in Japan, or to examine its emergence in the context of tourism development, a situation that this paper aims to redress with an exploratory analysis.
Although not synonymous with NBT, ecotourism is a branch of it, often involving "natural" destinations such as parks and protected areas (Boo 1990) . But ecotourism's blend of environmental, social, and economic goals has been touted as a new paradigm and, by purporting to reconcile tensions between development and conservation factions, the term now appears frequently Ϫ albeit ambiguously Ϫ within government manifestos for chiiki kasseika ('efforts to revitalize rural regions').
The semantic history of ecotourism can be traced back to the 1970s, when new ideas of "environmentalism" started to influence travel industry philosophy, creating increased demand for low-impact tourism. The ideology had reached a global audience by the 1980s, spread by multinational conservation organizations such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), as well as global campaigns such as the World Tourism Organization (WTO)'s 2002 Year of Ecotourism. Ecotourism was increasingly viewed as a sustainable alternative to mass tourism; yet, its broad appeal notwithstanding, a universal certification system remained elusive. Despite the lack of a single internationally recognized definition, its characteristics can be broadly summarized by the following criteria (Wunder 2000: 465Ϫ479):
1. Minimal physical and social impacts on the visited area. 2. Ecological education of the tourist at the natural site. 3. Notable economic participation by local residents.
In 1989, the founding of the Ogasawara Whale Watching Association marked the first commercial use of the term eko tsūrizumu 'ecotourism' in Japan (Hiwasaki 2006) . The timing coincided with the backfiring of policies such as the Resort Law, which came to be seen as the culmination of government's long-standing readiness to pour money into centralized tourism development plans irrespective of each region's individual merits. Moreover, environmental impacts including pollution and congestion were particularly noticeable at NBT destinations, so ecotourism seemed to represent a much-needed new approach.
Although originally taken up by the private sector, eko tsūrizumu was subsequently incorporated into the language of central government, with the publication of the 1990 "Iriomote Report" by the Ministry of Environment (hereafter MoE). 9 The MoE went on to adopt it wholeheartedly into their policy making; for example, after the Ecotourism Promotion Event, a series of meetings was conducted from 2003 to 2004 that resulted in the set-up of five initiatives to promote ecotourism concurrently across the country (Table 1) .
This ongoing discrepancy over the use of the term ensured that while the MoE formally adopted eko tsūrizumu, it was also still used by the private sector and NGOs. For example, the Japanese Ecotourism Society (hereafter JES) was established in 1998, and several other societies came into being soon after. Ecotourism also gained considerable traction with the media, especially outdoor and fashion magazines, while other JES initiatives included a list of "100 Recommended Ecoguides", a monthly forum, and an Eco-Café in Tokyo.
In terms of revitalizing the NBT market, the initial uptake of ecotourism was promising; for example, the percentage of urbanites Table 1 . Core MoE initiatives to promote ecotourism (Kaizu 2007) .
Initiative name Content
Ecotourism Charter Formal statement of guidelines, goals, and mitigation options. Ecotour Internet links to "best-practice" ecotours around Japan.
Compendium Ecotourism Prize
Annual award made to raise awareness and promote ecotourism. Ecotourism Manual Downloadable explanation of charter's practical application.
Ecotourism Model
Eight areas originally selected then extended to 13. Area familiar with the term eko tsūrizumu rose from 33.3% in 1999 33.3% in to 63% in 2005 33.3% in (JES 2007 ). Meanwhile, a 2006 MoE survey found over 70 "best-practice" ecotourism societies operating across Japan, with an extended membership of 20,000 people, a formidable labor force of resource stewards, even if the total does include some double counts. 10 These qualified guides were in heavy demand due to the imminent retirement of the baby-boomer generation from 2007 onward. A JETRO report noted that "boomers are inclined toward special interest tours (SIT) in which a small number of people travel to a place of particular interest" (Nitta 2006: 6) . As well as free time and substantial financial assets, many received lump-sum payments upon retirement, propelling their per capita consumption above other generations. Moreover, this market segment held a strong affinity for existing NBT grandstand destinations, such as Yakushima and Shiretoko, whose stock had risen on the back of UNESCO world natural heritage designation.
However, there have been significant challenges converting this potentially viable mix of supply and demand into a force powerful enough to sustain the NBT market. For although significant economic and political resources have been devoted to ecotourism, market penetration remains low, according to a random survey (repeated over 3 years from 2004 to 2006) of 500 people on the Kantō plain, where the proportion of people found to have actually experienced ecotourism was a mere 3.6% in 2004, 2% in 2005, and 3.4% in 2006. 11 Part of the problem has been the historical dominance of large, central travel agencies described in the earlier sections of the TALC analysis, as well as the lack of small and medium-sized enterprises responsible for driving innovation and competition in the ecotourism sector.
In light of these economic impediments to the emergence of a viable business model based on ecotourism, its current raison d'être can thus be seen largely in terms of policy making. NBT landscapes where public as well as private goods are consumed are in need of cross-cutting management, and ecotourism could theoretically offer a platform for building collaboration between diverse stakeholders. This was reflected by the Ecotourism Law, implemented in April 2008 to combine the forces of four government agencies: MLIT, MAFF, MEXT, and MoE.
It was also reflected by the balloting process for the MoE's model ecotourism areas, when applicants from areas of secondary nature (satoyama/umi) were most common.
12 Many of these areas were not established tourist destinations, or primeval wildernesses, but landscapes that have evolved through coexistence between humans and nature. This emphasis on "lived-in landscapes" underlined the expectations that ecotourism would contribute to the vibrancy of the countryside, building the capacity of local communities who could safeguard its nature and culture. Kaizu (2007: 4Ϫ8) has dubbed this phenomenon "Nihongata eko tsūrizumu" ('Japanese-style ecotourism'), claiming that it has inspired regional residents to review their immediate surroundings for resources and potential ecotourism attractions. Certainly, the satoyama/umi buffer zone plays a key role as the "neighborhood" environment, as well as providing an abundance of local cuisine, craft and specialty products highly suited to the commercial side of ecotourism.
But low levels of market penetration and high leakage means that eko tsūrizumu is likely to remain at the whim of policy makers Ϫ and ultimately dependent on government funding Ϫ for the foreseeable future. Moreover, evidence suggests that public reaction, initially favorable due to the timing of ecotourism's emergence that coincided with the backfiring of policies such as the Resort Law, may itself have peaked. For example, as of 2011, only one area, Hanno City, has registered to be a certified ecotourism area under the Ecotourism Promotion Law enacted in 2009. Therefore, in order to raise awareness among the public, a twin-track strategy is needed to simultaneously promote well-established, grandstand venues such as UNESCO World Natural Heritage sites in Yakushima, Shirakami, and Shiretoko, as well as supporting local community areas of satoyama/umi.
Other efforts to rejuvenate the industry
Alongside MoE's eko tsūrizumu, there have been numerous other governmental initiatives to promote rural tourism, including a drive to promote "green tourism from the Ministry of Agriculture following GATT agreements" (Tenorio 2005: 31) . This gurīn tsūrizumu is characterized as a part-time means of supplementing core income streams, whereby local farmers or foresters provide minshuku 'homestay' accommodation. The small-scale and individual ownership of local accommodation facilities has drawn comparisons to European agro-tourism, but the Japanese version relies more heavily on "exchange" programs Ϫ including educational tours made up of school children from the cities Ϫ and the average length of stay is thus shorter. Like ecotourism, green tourism can be seen in terms of a cultural backlash to the Resort Law's highly capitalized form of NBT development. Hence, numerous studies concur with a 2003 survey in which 60% of city dwellers stated that they would like to spend a fixed period of time relaxing in a rural village (MoE 2004) . But agro-tourism is necessarily reliant on the ability of farming, forestry, or fishing communities to play the role of host, whereas in the current reality, dwindling agricultural self-sufficiency only serves to emphasize the growing dependence of peripheral areas on the urban core. Meanwhile, gurīn tsūrizumu is said to be characterized by a lack of spontaneity due to its top-down implementation by central government agencies, in contrast to the bottom-up approach practiced in Europe (Tsuchiya 1997) .
Nor are eko tsūrizumu and gurīn tsūrizumu the only governmentsponsored attempts to rejuvenate NBT; other variants include health and adventure tourism. However, the validity of the industry as an economic growth pole has also been downplayed repeatedly for various reasons, including its perceived unreliability and the seasonal nature of employment. Entrenched thinking ensures that many bureaucrats remain skeptical of the long-term economic benefits of tourism per se, but a "restructured" and increasingly service-based rural economies emerged from the bubble more reliant on tourism than ever. Thus, for such regions suffering depopulation and the demise of linchpin industries such as agriculture and forestry, tourism is now ironically portrayed as a "last chance" to revitalize local economies.
Discussion
It should be remembered that tourism is a notoriously fickle industry, and NBT development in Japan has been increasingly shaped by international trends and other factors beyond the control of policy makers. Tourism has faced a string of recent challenges including unprecedented natural disasters, unrest in the Middle East, rising oil prices, and a weak dollar. Mergers and downsizing among tour operators testify to the extent of the global hardship. In 2007, for example, Thomas Cook took over MyTravel to create Europe's second-biggest package-tour firm, while TUI, the biggest travel company, merged with First Choice to create TUI Travel. Meanwhile, as a composite industry, tourism is also affected by factors as diverse as labor conditions, job mobility, and longer life expectancy.
Nonetheless, the TALC analysis conducted here points to some perennial problems in the NBT architecture, at least some of which are self-inflicted. Even if there is no easy remedy to the current malaise, the centralized and highly capitalized form of NBT which the Resort Law symbolized has surely lost credibility as a viable business model. Ecotourism remains a worthy policy objective; by harnessing natural and cultural resources while reconciling the trade-off between conservation and development, it shows great potential in revitalizing NBT destinations and their surrounding rural communities. However, there are four key action areas that need to be addressed if ecotourism is to achieve tangible results in Japan's NBT market.
Integrative policy objectives
Concerning nature parks, the fundamental divide between the logging objectives of the Forestry Agency (FA) and the conservation-based administration of the MoE has already been mentioned. Despite attempts to remedy the situation, the poor integration between landowners (FA) and managers (MoE) inevitably results in disjointed tourism and land use policies. There is thus a need for better cooperation among central government agencies to create integrated NBT policies.
Consistent ecotourism policy framework
Since its arrival in Japan, eko tsūrizumu has been used regularly in MoE policy making. Yet given the prevalence of the kind of splintered management described above, this risks alienating other government agencies, making it harder for them to use the term, and thereby undermining integrative policy-making platforms. Attempts have been made to rectify this situation, notably the Ecotourism Law, which came into force in April 2008 and combined four government agencies: MLIT, MAFF, MEXT, and MoE.
Sufficient fiscal commitment
With a role in protecting a range of public goods, from satoyama to national parks, Nihongata eko tsūrizumu will require long-term financial aid if it is to function as an NBT policy. Moreover, unlike the Resort Law, which poured state money into regional revitalization through ever larger, more convenient destinations, eko tsūrizumu requires a more subtle range of financial incentives to nurture small and medium-sized enterprises through favorable terms for loans and grants. Yet as long as eko tsūrizumu falls under the MoE's jurisdiction, obtaining and renewing meaningful budgets will remain problematic. Despite becoming a ministry in 2001, with only 1,048 staff it remains "the smallest ministry in terms of personnel and budget size" (Imura 2005: 56) .
Capacity-building among rural communities
Eko tsūrizumu has so far consisted largely of top-down initiatives, but to be effective management of resources such as national parks requires partnership and active participation by locals (Hiwasaki 2005) . NBT destinations thus need capacity building and a greater role for NGOs to foster self-sufficient host communities, but to do so requires a reversal of certain aspects of the ongoing process of centralization highlighted in the TALC analysis above. 
Implications
To reach out to new markets and "Rejuvenate" NBT, a range of counter-strategies are needed that encourage holistic development to capitalize on Japan's competitive advantages. Yet, despite the belated interest in inbounds, there have been few attempts to rebrand NBT destinations, extending their core following beyond domestic visitors to target the growth segments in neighboring East Asian markets. Internationalizing ski resorts is one of the few successful examples to date; access infrastructure to the mountains and powder snow are already making Japan a global market leader in places such as Niseko in Hokkaido.
However, to implement such strategies in a sustainable way, national leadership is needed through consistent interdepartmental objectives structured around a clear vision. One cross-cutting tool is eco-certification: systems already exist to reward conservation or more efficient use of resources. The new Ecotourism Law has the power to confer national recognition to local ecotourism enterprises, paving the way for integrated campaigns that promote local ecotourism at a national level. Another necessary tool is regulation: the new law also has the legal teeth to administer fines to lawbreakers, and this could be complemented by a range of "soft" policies such as interpretative programs and collaboration between travel agents and guide associations.
Better participation in joint ventures between private sector and management authorities is also vital. For example, at the Ecotourism College in Urabandai, in the Bandai Asahi National Park, a monitoring system has been established based on a collaboration of stakeholders that include a local university and resident groups, as well as independ-ent organizations and NPOs. Surveys are completed in the field by guides and organizers, as well as participants, thus creating a user database that reflects the conservation of the natural environment. This active involvement of visitors has been found to have educational benefits beyond passive rule making, encouraging proactive interaction with the natural environment. It can also increase the likelihood of a return visit. Meanwhile, involving communities in the conservation process increases their sense of stewardship over resources.
Although such programs are still scarce, it is hoped that successful examples such as Urabandai, one of the original MoE Model Areas, can provide inspiration for other sites. By offering employment and sustainable development while still conserving cultural values and local landscapes, ecotourism is touted as a way of breaking down the frequent barriers between diverse stakeholders including bureaucratic factions, private enterprises, and local residents. Moreover, the added value that ecotourism represents has potential for both supply and demand sides, with marketing potential and economic benefits on the one side, and the opportunity to educate and inform visitors on the other.
Limitations
The TALC model chosen for this analysis has been applied to the development cycle of beach resorts and islands, but has some serious limitations when applied on a national scale. The model was originally devised for single destinations, rather than an interconnected system of resorts. And besides geographic overlap, the cyclical "boom-and-bust" nature of tourism subsegments impedes market meta-analysis. Previous research has documented a series of such booms in Japan, including mountain climbing (1955 to 1959), private cars (from 1967), skiing (1980 to 1992) , and the "100 peaks" boom that peaked in 1991 and was characterized by baby boomer groups of mountain climbers (Hirose 2007) . These subsegments are interconnected, which makes unraveling the causes and consequences of NBT complicated. For example, the accommodation sector was closely pegged to the explosive growth and subsequent decline of the ski industry so that the total number of minshuku in 1997 stood at 20,000, down from a peak of 26,000 in the 1970s (Tsuchiya 1997) .
Another serious consideration is the incomplete nature of nature park data (e.g., no prewar data exist) and general unreliability of tourism statistics, although this is by no means a situation unique to Japan. Wells (1997: 17Ϫ22) noted that although tourism claims "to be the world's largest industry and provider of jobs […] measurement is notoriously difficult and accurate statistics are scarce". However, given the lack of an entrance ticket system, even the numbers of visits to Japan's nature parks are estimates affected by counting techniques (Hirata 2006) . Hence, data collection itself consists of approximations based on inexact averages such as the number of buses or taxis per day. Other commonly cited problems related to data collection are frequent changes in personnel or collection methods, as well as regional variation and the lack of standardized procedures.
Finally, the macro nature of this study has necessitated considerable methodological streamlining, resulting in generalizations. Even the data set selected Ϫ annual natural park visitation Ϫ does not take into account the activity type or quality of experience at the destination. Hence, all manner of visits from drive-throughs to overnight backcountry stays are included in the same category, even though the social, environmental, and economic impacts are likely to vary by different visitor types. Nonetheless, these limitations were necessary for the sake of creating a holistic synthesis of NBT development, and it will be the job of future research to unravel the intricacies of individual destination development stories.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper employed Butler's TALC model as a framework to track the rise and fall of NBT in Japan through six stages of NBT visitation from "Exploration" to the post-stagnation stages of either "Decline" or "Rejuvenation". First, "Exploration" examined how religion was both a means and an end for travel. Indigenous connections with nature were married with imported Western perceptions of landscape. "Involvement" saw infrastructure established and NBT assumed a mantle of regional development driven by local entrepreneurs and booster factions, especially transport and real estate conglomerates. On the supply side, the National Park system was established in 1934, while on the demand side the first package tours were created in the same year, paving the way for mass tourism in the postwar era as urban demand for NBT rocketed. "Development" brought tourism to the masses; NBT became so successful that an upper limit of 20 national parks was set and promptly broken. NBT became increasingly centralized and bundled with land use policy, but by "Consolidation" visitation growth had cooled due to intensifying competition between domestic resorts and from overseas markets. Within rural Japan, inequalities intensified, but overall NBT visitation leveled off causing "Stagnation". PublicϪprivate consortiums sought to galvanize depopulated rural communities into large-scale development projects epitomized by the Resort Law, but the financial and environmental consequences were for the most part disastrous, leading to a prolonged period of "Decline".
After the bubble, ecotourism showed promise as a tool for "Rejuvenation", but to be effective it needs more integrative policy objectives, a consistent framework, long-term fiscal commitment and capacity building among rural communities. Market penetration remains low, so in order to raise awareness, a twin ecotourism strategy is proposed to promote well-established, grandstand venues such as UNESCO World Natural Heritage sites in Yakushima, Shirakami, and Shiretoko, while simultaneously supporting grassroots satoyama/umi areas. The rise and fall of Japan's NBT market offers insights for other locations that face a decline of tourism markets and increased regional inequality.
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Notes
11. Reasons for this low figure were stated as "likelihood of being expensive", "a lack of information", "need for special equipment", and "reliance on the weather" (JES 2007). 12. Satoyama is a Japanese term for a patchwork of secondary ecosystems, including forests, farm lands, irrigation ponds, and grasslands, which have been managed in close proximity to human settlements to ensure ecosystem services for human well-being. The concept has recently been extended to sato-umi in marine and coastal areas.
